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RESPONSE TO WATKINS' STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Both Appellee Tom Watkins ("Watkins") and Appellant Henry Day Ford, Inc. ("HDF")
acknowledge that the obligation of HDF to sell Watkins a Ford GT40 "was subject to the condition
precedent" that it had a Ford GT40 to sell to Watkins.
With regard to the application of the condition precedent, Watkins cited, Commercial Union
Associates v.Clayton, 863 P. 2d 23 (Utah App 1993). Watkins, however, failed to address all of the
Court's discussion of the Commercial decision relevant to a condition precedent.
It is relevant to observe the Court in Commercial additionally held:
A meeting of the minds between contracting parties is essential to the
formation of any contract: A condition precedent to the enforcement of any
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out, either expressly or implicitly, with sufficient definiteness to be
enforced. (Cited cases omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
The Court continued:
A condition precedent is one which must be performed by the one party to an
existing contract before the other party is obligated. (Citations omitted) Courts
must respect express conditions precedent. Generally speaking, neither of
the parties, nor the court has any right to ignore or modify conditions which
are clearly expressed merely because it may subject one of the parties to
hardship, but they must be enforced "in accordance with the intentions as...
manifested by the language used by the parties to the contract." (Citations
Omitted).
Watkins went to HDF and specifically asked to purchase a GT40 (Watkins Testimony, Trial
Transcript ("TT") 44:15-16). The Contracts that Watkins signed reflected only the name "GT40"
without further clarification or additional detail. (Watkins Testimony, TT 47:9-11). The Trial Court
found at Finding of Factfl11:

1

It is undisputed that plaintiff specifically requested that defendant sell him a Ford
GT40 automobile and plaintiff's request was specifically referenced in the Contracts
which were executed by plaintiff and defendant.
At the time of the signing of the Contracts, there was a meeting of the minds only regarding
the Ford GT40, which was a vehicle model that Ford had manufactured and a model which Ford
could introduce in the future.1 HDF has never had a GT40 available to sell to Watkins (Day
Testimony, TT 139:2-3), and, therefore, the condition precedent has not occurred. As such, HDF
cannot be in breach of the Contracts.
Watkins continues "This case is, in some respects, similar to Koenen v. Roval Buick Co.
162 Ariz 376, 783 P2d 822 (Ariz App. 1989)". (Watkins Brief ("WB"), pg. 9.) The dissimilarities,
however, between these cases cause Koenen not to be instructive or even helpful in deciding this
case. Koenen and the present case address vehicle sales contracts for limited edition vehicles and
in both cases the dealerships were uncertain at the time the contracts were formed whether the
subject vehicles would be available for them to sell. In Koenen. Royal (the dealership), inquired
from General Motors whether it would be allocated a "GNX" vehicle. A few months later Royal was
notified that it would be allocated a GNX. Royal, however, mailed a letter to Koenen informing him
that it would not be able to sell him a GNX. The letter included a check in the amount of Koenen's
$500 deposit. Koenen declined to cash the check. In this case, HDF inquired from Ford, nine (9)
months after it accepted Watkins' deposit, whether it would be allocated a GT40. HDF was advised
that it was not likely to be allocated a GT40. After receiving notice from Ford, HDF notified

1

Jeremy Day testified: "Q: So, is it possible that Ford could yet come out with another GT40? A:
Absolutely." (Day Testimony, TT 138:21-23.) Watkins also testified: "Q: Isn't it possible, sir, that Ford
could also in the future manufacture, produce a Ford GT40? A: I guess anything is possible".
2

Watkins, in a letter, that it would not be allocated a GT40 and returned Watkins' deposit. Watkins,
unlike Koenen, promptly deposited the check into his account. Koenen prepared a protest letter and
sent it to Royal. Watkins failed to contact HDF in any fashion upon the return of his deposit.
(Watkins Testimony, TT 80:7-9.)
In, Koenen, the subject vehicle was physically delivered to Royal within a few months of
the contract. In this case, HDF was not notified that it would receive a Ford GT until years after the
contracts were signed. HDF submits that it is commercially unreasonable to require HDF to be
bound by Contracts over two (2) years after the deposit and consideration for the Contracts had
been returned to and accepted by Watkins.
RESPONSE TO WATKINS' "STATEMENT OF FACTS"
Watkins does not dispute the Statement of Facts presented in HDF's initial Brief. HDF will
respond only to those portions of Watkins' Statement of Facts ("Watkins Facts") which HDF
believes require clarification or correction.

Watkins' Facts are not set forth in numbered

paragraphs. Accordingly, HDF's only references are the page numbers on which the disputed facts
are located.
1.

At page 3 of Watkins' Facts, Watkins states:
Watkins inquired if Henry Day Ford might be allocated any Ford
GT40s and, if yes, would it sell him [Watkins] one? Watkins Tr. 421. Kersey replied that Henry Day Ford might be allocated one,

2

Jeremy Day testified: Q. Going back to when you wrote the letter and had the check prepared to
the plaintiff, did you believe that you were -- held his deposit for a reasonable time? A. Yes. Q. Have
you often held a check for eight or nine months on deposit? A. Not that I can recall. Q. In fact, this was
unusual - A, Absolutely. Q. - that you held it longer than usual. Is that correct? A. Absolutely, yea."
(Day Testimony, TT 141:12-23).
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perhaps two GT40s, although it was not certain it would be
allocated any. Kersey indicated that if Ford allocated and delivered
to it any GT40s, it was willing to sell them to Watkins. Watkins Tr.
46:6-13.
Steve Kersey, an employee of HDF, did not indicate to Watkins that HDF "might be
allocated one, perhaps two GT40s". Mr. Kersey testified that when Watkins inquired as to whether
HDF would sell him a GT40, Mr. Kersey told Watkins that "at that time I did not know whether we
were going to be allocated anything". (Kersey Testimony, TT111:23-24.)
2.

At page 4 of Watkins' Facts, Watkins accurately states that each "Contract specified

a down payment in the amount of $1,000.00". It is important to note that the $1,000.00 was paid
by Watkins to HDF as consideration for HDF entering into the Contracts, and to "secure the deal".
(Watkins Testimony, TT 77:24.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT STRICTLY LIMITING ITS REVIEW
TO THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTIES'
CONTRACTS.
A.

Watkins references Shakespeare's quotation: "What's in a name?" and then

asks the question, "What is a name? That is the question". (WB, pg. 13.) The answer is: "A word
or phrase identifying or designating a person or thing and distinguishing that person or thing from
others." (Black Law Dictionary. 7th Ed., pg. 1043.) Certainly the name "Ford GT40" does not mean
a Ford Focus, or other vehicle model. To suggest a specific noun does not identify a particular
person or thing is nonsense.
In this case, it is undisputed that Watkins asked to purchase from HDF a specific thing -

4

a"Ford GT40". Watkins, at trial, described the Ford GT40 as "[b]eautiful. The car was iconic. The
car was widely acclaimed and famous". (Watkins Testimony, TT 39:6-7.) Watkins entered into two
(2) Contracts with HDF to purchase only the named and specific referenced "beautiful, iconic,
widely acclaimed, and famous" GT40. Watkins acknowledges: "Both Contracts identified the motor
vehicle covered by the Contracts to be a new Ford GT40". (WB, pg. 14; Watkins' Facts, pg. 3-4).
Watkins argues that the Ford GT40 was merely a name for a 'concept car' and that the
name morphed to the Ford GT. This argument fails for several reasons:
First, Watkins, as noted, asked to purchase a vehicle that he acknowledged existed, or
could in the future be manufactured.
Second, Watkins stated in his Brief: "At the 2002 North American International Auto Show
in Detroit, in January 2002, Ford Motor Company unveiled the Ford GT40 concept car, which was
based on the Ford GT40 that Ford had built and successfully raced in the mid -1960's at LeMans."
(WB pg. 2; see also, Watkins Testimony, TT 38:20-39:16; 54:9-17; Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12.)
Watkins asked to buy an identifiable vehicle by using an exact name. The vehicle requested by
Watkins was then referenced in the Contracts. Watkins knew that the Contracts had to be
completed accurately. (Watkins Testimony, TT 69:17-19.)
Third, Watkins did not ask to purchase the 'Ford GT40 concept car' or the 'car unveiled at
the 2002 North American Auto Show'. In fact, at no time during the trial did Watkins personally
ever utter the word "concept" with reference to a vehicle.3 The trial transcript is devoid of any
3

The word "concept" is cited ten (10) times in the trial transcript. One (1) time, "concept" is referenced
in Steve Kersey's testimony and nine (9) times, "concept" is referenced in Jeremy Day's testimony. No
where at trial did Watkins use the word "concept" to describe the car he wanted.

5

reference by Watkins that he requested a 'concept car' or the 'vehicle unveiled at the 2002 North
American International Auto Show'.
Fourth, HDF submits that Watkins' actions support the conclusion that he only wanted to
purchase a GT40. Watkins as an experienced automobile dealer appreciated that the Contracts
could be amended or modified. (Watkins Testimony, TT 34:23-24; 70:24-25; 71:1.) In fact, the day
after the Contracts were signed, Watkins called HDF and asked that the Contracts be amended
to include the sales price as "MSRP", a request which HDF accommodated. Watkins testified that
he followed "these cars [GT40] for years". (Watkins Testimony, TT 91:3.) Trial Exhibit 12 which
references the Ford GT was published in June 2003. Yet, Watkins testified:
Q. And was there a time when you found out that it was going to be the Ford GT?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And did you call Henry Day?
A. No.
(Watkins Testimony, TT 75:8-12.). Watkins' failure to amend the Contracts to reference the Ford
GT when he knew the name was changed shows that Watkins contracted for and wanted a GT-40.
B.

Utah law clearly directs that a contract which is not ambiguous be enforced

as written. In South Ridge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Brown. 226 P.3d 758, 2010 UT App 23 (Utah
App., 2010) the Court of Appeals held:
Accordingly, our interpretation of the relevant provisions is limited to the four
corners of the CC&Rs, and we of course interpret the relevant language in light of
the overall meaning and intent of the CC&Rs. See Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins.
2009 UT 52,1| 19,215 P.3d 933 ("When we interpret a contract,... we determine
the intent of the contracting parties by first look[ing] to the writing alone. If the
writing is unambiguous, we determine the intent of the parties exclusively from the
plain meaning of the contractual language.") (alteration in original) (citation
footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).

6

1.

The Court of Appeals erred in the interpretation of the Contracts.

Watkins states at page 14 of his Brief: "Watkins testified at trial that the vehicle he had agreed to
buy, when he signed the Contracts, was"the car known at the time as the Ford GT40 and the car
that Mr. Kersey and I both described at the time as being the Ford GT40". (Watkins Testimony,
TT 72:9-13.) HDF submits that this statement is inaccurate. Mr. Kersey testified:
Q . . . . [d]id Mr. Watkins ask specifically for a Ford GT40?
A. He did.
Q. And is that what's represented in the contracts your prepared?
A. It is.
Q. And that is your understanding of what Mr. Watkins wanted?
A. Yes.
(Kersey Testimony, TT 117:18-23; 118:6-8.)
This Court recently held in Selvig v. Blockbuster Enterprises.. 2011UT 39 fl23 (Utah 2011):
In construing a contract, the intention of the contracting parties is controlling "In
interpreting a contract, we look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties'
intentions, and we consider each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. ("When
determining whether t h e . . . language is ambiguous, we attempt to harmonize all
of the contract's provisions and all of its terms." "If the language of the contract is
unambiguous, the intention of the parties may be determined as a matter of law
based on the language of the agreement." If, however, the language is found to be
ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions. To
determine whether contractual language is ambiguous, the court may consider any
relevant evidence so that it can place itself in the same position as the parties at
the time the contract was entered. A finding of ambiguity is justified only if, after
reviewing all of the evidence, "the competing interpretations are reasonably
supported by the language of the contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted).
(Emphasis added)
In this case, it is clear that the intention of the parties was for HDF to sell, and for Watkins
to purchase, a GT40.

7

2.

The Appellate Court also erred in its standard of review of the

interpretation of the Contracts. This Court also held in Selvia at f18:
A contract's interpretation may be either a question of law,
determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact,
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent." When a district court
"interprets a contract as a matter of law, we accord its construction
no particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness
standard." . But if the district court "proceeds to find facts
respecting the intentions of the parties based on extrinsic
evidence, then our review is strictly limited."(Internal quotation
marks omitted) (Emphasis added.)
The Contracts are clear and unambiguous. If there was an ambiguity, it was a 'latent'
ambiguity because of a purported name change by Ford. The Trial Court heard the testimony
regarding the Contract formation and admitted Exhibit 12, the June 2003 press release. The Trial
Court considered the alleged ambiguity and the intentions of the parties and then specifically found:
It was undisputed that plaintiff specifically requested that defendant sell him
Ford GT40 automobiles and plaintiffs' request was specifically referenced in
the Contracts which were executed by the plaintiff and defendant. (Emphasis
added.)
Plaintiff reviewed the Contracts which specified that the automobile to be
purchased by plaintiff was a Ford "GT 40", found them to be accurate, and signed
both written Contracts, as did Mr. Kersey on behalf of defendant.
(Trial Court Findings of Fact fflj, 11, and 13.)
The Trial Court concluded:
The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to plaintiff a "Ford GT 40".
The Contracts specifically provide that plaintiff contracted to purchase two (2) "Ford
GT 40" automobiles. Plaintiff claims that he contracted to purchase Ford GT
automobiles which claim differs from the actual Contracts.

8

(Trial Court Conclusions of Law ffl[4, 6.)
As a matter of law, the Appellate Court's inquiry should have been strictly limited because
of the Trial Court's findings regarding the intentions of the parties based on extrinsic evidence.
This Court held in Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985) the strict limitation inquiry
involved:
If a trial court interprets a contract as a matter of law, we accord its
construction no particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness
standard. However, if the contract is not an integration or is ambiguous and
the trial court proceeds to find facts respecting the intentions of the parties
based on extrinsic evidence, then our review is strictly limited. (Emphasis
added.) (Citations omitted.)
[T]his Court is obliged to review the evidence and all inferences that may be drawn
therefrom in a light most supportive of the findings of the trier of fact. The findings
and judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed when they are based on
substantial, competent, admissible evidence. (Citations omitted).
Notwithstanding the evidence and testimony at trial and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law entered by the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court by
finding a latent ambiguity, which was outside the appropriate standard of review of the Appellate
Court in this case.
3.

In the present case, the Trial Court concluded that the "Contracts

are clear and unambiguous and were intended to be the final and complete expression of the
parties' bargain" and that the "Contracts between the parties are integrated agreements". (Trial
Court Conclusions of Law fifl, 2.) The Appellate Court agreed with the Trial Court that "there
exists no facial ambiguity in either of the contracts at issue here". The Appellate Court, however,
found that there is a latent ambiguity in the contracts at issue here, created by Ford's later decision

9

to name the anticipated car the GT instead of the GT40. (Appellate Court Decision

flfl4,16.)

First, even if there was an ambiguity, parol evidence that explains the parties' intent cannot
contradict the terms of the written contract. Novell. Inc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App
162,92 P.3d 768 (Utah App., 2004) (where a binding agreement exists, whether completely or
partially integrated, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or discussions is not
admissible to contradict terms of the written agreement.); State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey. 565 P.2d
413,418 (Utah 1977) (parol evidence... will not be received for the purpose of varying or adding
to the terms of the written agreement).
The Appellate Court was correct in its holding that "[w]hen the parties chose the term GT40,
it was unambiguous and meant that, the parties were contracting for the sale of what was then
known as the GT40." (Appellate Court Decision f l 4 . )
The Appellate Court, however, continued opining that the perceived ambiguity of the
meaning of the Ford GT40 developed later, when Ford decided to name the anticipated car the
Ford GT. (Appellate Court Decision fl16.) In the Appellate Court's holding, this re-naming of the
vehicle created a latent ambiguity that demanded extrinsic evidence, in order to determine what
the parties meant by their reference to the term "GT40". (Appellate Court Decision fflf 15,16.)
However, this is where the Appellate Court, and Watkins, err in their analysis. HDF asserts that
when a latent ambiguity does exist it is necessary to receive evidence of what each party
subjectively thought at the time of contracting, certainly not years later. Ward v. Intermountain
Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995). See also, Restatement (Second) of Contracts §212 &
cmt. b (1979); Corbin §579; C.R. Anthony Co. V. Loretto Mall Partners. 112 N.M. 504,508-09,817
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P.2d 238,24243 (1991) (Rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all
credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties... so that the court can 'place itself
in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time of contracting'.)
The latent ambiguity situation is unique and requires that the courts look to the subjective
intention of the parties, rather than the later perceived facts. Again, it is necessary to receive
evidence of what each party subsequently thought at the time of contracting, to determine if a
latent ambiguity exists. ]o\ If there is a latent ambiguity then there is no contract because the
evidence is undisputed that there was no meeting of the minds as to the subject of the Contracts.
See, Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 P2d 23 (Utah App 1993). See also, Raffles
v. Wichelhaus. 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864) (Each parties' subsequent expression of the ship
indicated to the court that they did not intend the same ship at the time of contracting, and therefore
there was no contract.)
POINT II:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT WATKINS DID NOT
WAIVE OR ABANDON HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS.

The Trial Court found the facts established a waiver and/or abandonment of the Contracts
by the parties.
A.

The totality of facts justified the finding by the Trial Court that Watkins had

waived his rights under the Contracts. This Court held in Soters Inc. v. Deseret Federal Saving &
Loan, 857 P2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993):
We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct. Under this
legal standard, a fact finder need only determine whether the totality of the
circumstances "warrants the inference of relinquishment". (Emphasis added.)

11

In the case of Kenny v. Rich. 2008 UT App 209, fl 18,186 P.3d 989, the Utah Court of
Appeals held:
Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a mixed question of law and fact.
Thus, "we "grant broadened discretion to the trial court's findings' when reviewing
questions of waiver." (Citations omitted.)
(See also red Cliffs Comer v JJ Hunan. 2009 Ut App 240 f l 5 . )
The Appellate Court's decision to reverse the Trial Court is contrary to the totality of the
facts. Further, the Appellate Court's decision is a departure from well-established law and creates
uncertainty and confusion, For these reasons, the Appellate Court should be reversed.
B.

The Appellate Court incorrectly applied the law of waiverto Watkins'

knowledge and actions under the Contracts. It is fundamental that where parties have rights under
an existing contract they have exactly the same power to renegotiate terms or to waive such rights
as they had to make the contract in the first place. Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc. 10 Utah 2d 53,348
P.2d 337 (1960). As a consequence, under Utah law, waiver can operate to prevent a party from
demanding strict compliance with a contract when the parties have waived their rights. The
undisputed facts establish that Watkins waived the formal requirements of the Contracts.
The Appellate Court incorrectly held that "there was simply no relinquishment by Watkins
of a known right in this case". (Appellate Court Decision fl 17.) The Appellate Court based its
decision on the theory "that there is simply no evidence whatsoever indicating that Watkins knew
he still had rights under the Contracts at the time he negotiated the check concerning his deposit."
(Appellate Court Decision fl 18.) The Appellate Court's conclusion is inconsistent with the
undisputed facts of the case.
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A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a
right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent
decision. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right
waived, with an awareness of its consequences.
28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver §2002 (2002).
With regard to the deposit paid by Watkins at the time he entered into the Contracts,
Watkins specifically testified that the deposits were part of the Contracts
Q. ...[Y]ou and Mr. Kersey agreed to the thousand dollars [deposit for each
GT40]?
A. Yes.
Q. And the thousand dollars was part of the contract [Trial Exhibits D—D4],
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Well that deposit was important, was it not sir?
A. "Yes".
Q. Did you call Henry Day and say, "Keep my check?
A. No.
Q. Did you call to object to them returning it to them - to you?
A. No.
(Watkins Testimony TT 78:20-25; 79:21-25; 80:5-9.)
Watkins accepted his deposit back, knowing it was an important part of the Contracts,
without objection, and without inquiry about the status of the President's Award. Watkins' conduct
in not contacting Henry Day Ford about the return of his deposit or for any other reason prior to
June 2005 demonstrated Watkins' waiver of his rights under the Contracts.
In Soter's this Court held:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver,
there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence,
and an intention to relinquish it. (Citations omitted.) We further clarify that the
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intent to relinquish a right must be distinct. Under this legal standard, a fact finder
need only determine whether the totality of the circumstances "warrants the
inference of relinquishment." (Citations omitted.) Such a flexible approach is
particularly important because waiver is a term which has various meanings
depending on the facts and the context in which it is used. 92 C.J.S. Waiver 1041
(1955).
Waiver has three elements, the third of which is "an intention to relinquish the right." \jl at
940. Here, Watkins had the existing right to purchase two Ford GT40s, if HDF had been allocated
a Ford GT40. As to this third element, Watkins argues that he did not intend to waive his rights
under the Contracts when he negotiated the return of his check. Watkins knew of his rights under
the Contracts, yet he intentionally and distinctly relinquished those rights as shown by his accepting
the return of his deposit. In fact, there is not one event presented by Watkins that even infers that
he did not intentionally and distinctly waive enforcement of the Contracts.
Watkins argues in his Brief that the fact that he was an experienced car dealer is irrelevant
as to whether he knew of his rights under the Contracts. However, under Utah law, sophisticated
business parties are charged with knowledge of the terms of the contracts that they enter into.
ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts. 245 P.3d 184 (2010). Thus, when a party like Watkins
enters into a standard vehicle purchase contract, he
[i]s not permitted to show that [he] did not know its terms, and in the absence of
fraud or mistake [he] will be bound by all its provisions, even though [he] has not
read the agreement and does not know its contents.
Semenov v.Hill, 1999 UT 58, If 12, 982 P.2d 578. As a sophisticated business party, Watkins is
charged with the knowledge of all potential rights under the Contracts, and this certainly should be
considered in determining whether he could waive those rights.
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This Court noted in Soter's, that in Utah, a distinct intent to waive may only be shown by
a preponderance of the evidence. j d at 942, n. 6. Watkins' waiver of his rights were distinctly
made when he deposited the return of his deposit because, as mentioned above, he was aware
of the deposit's importance to the Contracts.
This Court held in United Park v. Stichtinq Mayflower. 140 P.3d 1200 ff21, 2006 UT 35
(Utah, 2006):
Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a mixed question of law and fact.
(Cited cases omitted) "[W]hether the trial court employed the proper standard of
waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions
or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed
as factual determinations." Accordingly, we "grant broadened discretion to the
trial court's findings" when reviewing questions of waiver. (Emphasis added.)
Watkins testified that "[he] did discuss and other dealers were aware of the Presidents
Award". (Watkins Testimony TT 102:23-25; 103:1-8; 104:24-25; 105:1-5.) Watkins also testified
that he and Steve Kersey discussed the President's Award in his first meeting at HDF. Watkins
testified:
Q But you never discussed that [the President's Award with Mr. Kersey [the Henry
Day sales person], did you sir?
A. We did talk about the President's Award.
....All I [Watkins] know is as I was calling dealers from Ogden down to Provo, they
made me aware of a President's Award and that in some way that figured into
the allocation.
Q And when did that happen, sir? When did they tell you that?
A In March of'02. (Emphasis added.)
(Watkins Testimony, TT 103:6-8; TT 104:24-25; 105:1-5.)
Watkins by his testimony recognized that he still had rights under the Contracts because
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he knew that the allocation of the Ford GT40s was based on the Presidents Award, and that HDF
was not assured an allocation.4
The Trial Court specifically held: "Plaintiff [Watkins], by his actions, unequivocally
demonstrated his intent to relinquish his rights to purchase the subject vehicles from defendant
[HDF]". (Findings of Fact fl41.) The Trial Court concluded at its Conclusions of Law flO:
Plaintiffs acceptance of the return of his deposit and his subsequent inaction
clearly demonstrate plaintiffs voluntary relinquishment of his known rights
particularly with plaintiffs experience in the auto dealership industry and both
parties' uncertainty as to when and if defendant would receive the contracted
vehicles.
In Ahrendt v. Bobbitt. 119 Utah 465, 229 P.2d 296, 297 (1951), this Court held:
A party to a contract, who is entitled to demand performance of a condition
precedent, may waive the same, either expressly or by acts evidencing such
intention; and performance of a condition precedent to taking effect of the contract
may be waived by the acts of the parties in treating the agreement as in effect.
See also, Caldwell v. Anschutz Drilling Co.. 13 Utah 2d 177,369 P.2d 964, 966 (1962) (cited with
approval in Lone Mountain Prod. Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am.. 984 F.2d 1551,1557
(10th Cir. 1992)).
In Geisdorfv. Doughty. 972 P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court held:
[M]ere silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation to speak. It
is generally accepted that a duty to speak will not be found where the contracting
parties' deal at arm's length and where the underlying facts are reasonably within
the knowledge of both parties. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff is obliged
to take reasonable steps to inform himself and to protect his own interest.
Watkins did not take the reasonable steps under Geisdorf to inform himself or protect his
4

Q. In your conversations with Mr. Kersey, did you understand Henry Day Ford would definitely
receive one of these automobiles? A. No. (Watkins Testimony, TT 45:15-18.)
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interests. Watkins should have contacted HDF to determine whether he would like HDF to continue
to hold his checks, but he did not. Watkins rather deposited the check and forgot about the
Contracts until 2005. Clearly, Watkins' actions were inconsistent with the Contracts.
Watkins asserts that "a person cannot waive a right before he or she is in position to assert
it." (Quoting 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §201(2000).) Watkins claims that he could only
assert his right, i.e. to purchase the vehicles, when the vehicles had been allocated and delivered.
However, Watkins was, at all times during the Contracts, able to assert his rights under the
Contracts, not just when the vehicles were delivered. Watkins could have asserted his rights under
the Contracts when his deposit was returned to him, by contacting HDF and not cashing the check,
if his intention was to maintain those rights.
HDF asserts that the facts indicate an unequivocal intent on Watkins' part to relinquish any
right he had under the Contracts, thus constituting waiver as a matter of law.
C.

The Appellate Court erred when it provided in the footnote of its Decision that HDF's

good faith representation and return of Watkins' check was irrelevant. Watkins argues that the
Appellate Court did not err when it provided that "whether Henry Day was acting in good faith by
making an educated guess [about whether it would be allocated a GT40] was irrelevant..."
(Appellate Court Decision fl19 n.7.) "Further, notwithstanding any good faith, the unequivocal
statement from HDF was simply incorrect." (Id.) The "statement" which Watkins is referring to here
is contained in HDF's December 31, 2002 letter to Watkins:
[ejnclosed please find a check for the refund of deposit on your vehicle order. We
regret to inform you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this
vehicle.
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HDF asserts that the Appellate Court erred because the statement by HDF was more than
an "educated guess" it was commercially reasonable under the circumstances, i.e. HDF having
never won a major Ford award that would have precipitated an allocation of a Ford GT40 in its 40
year history. Nevertheless, Watkins' claims the representations made by HDF in the letter dated
December 31, 2002 were false. The letter was based on HDF's good faith efforts in contacting
Ford to determine if they would be allocated any Ford GT40s without winning the President's
Award or Share of the Nation Award. (Trial Court Findings of Fact ffl[24,25.) It cannot be disputed
that at the time the letter was sent to Watkins (December 31, 2002), the statement contained
therein was true and accurate based upon current information.
In addition, the letter makes no reference to whether or not the return of Watkins' deposit
was based on the President's Award. Watkins, as mentioned above, was fully aware that there
remained a possibility that HDF would be allocated the vehicle if it won a Ford award in the future.
Watkins' undisputed actions demonstrated that he waived his rights in the Contracts
D.

The Appellate Court erred when it determined that the Contracts had

not been abandoned. At page 33 of his Brief, Watkins states:
The burden to prove "abandonment" of a contract does not involve substantially
different or less rigorous standard of proof than does "waiver", as Henry Day Ford
seems to imply in its present Brief- by presenting and arguing "abandonment" and
"waiver as separate and distinct affirmative defenses.
As demonstrated above and below, waiver and abandonment, while similar, are two distinct
claims. "Waiver" is defined as the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right and
"abandonment" is the intentional, unequivocal relinquishment of a benefit due from another.
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Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App., 1988). Both claims have been argued separately
throughout this litigation.
If there is a dispute whether abandonment has occurred, "it is usually a question of fact to
be determined from the circumstances of the particular case, which include not only
nonperformance, but also expressions of intent and other actions of the parties". Timpanoaos
Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 484 (Utah 1975). In determining those facts and
circumstances, the trial court is given "considerable latitude and should not be reversed unless the
finding is clearly erroneous or if this Court is otherwise persuaded that a mistake has been made."
See also, Adair v. Bracken. 745 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Utah Rule of Civ. P. 52(a).
The trial court's findings that the parties abandoned their contract will not be reversed "unless we
are persuaded that the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings.

Timpanoqos

Highlands. 544 P.2d at 484.
In this case, the trial court found that both parties had acted as if they had abandoned the
Contracts.
Plaintiff, by his acceptance of his deposit without reservation, objection, or
condition, unequivocally demonstrated his abandonment of the Contracts.
Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored by defendant over two (2) years
after plaintiff accepted a return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court finds that
defendant returned plaintiff's check in good faith and based upon the reasonable
belief they would not be allotted any Ford GT 40's.
Plaintiff, by his actions, unequivocally demonstrated his intent to relinquish his
rights to purchase the subject vehicles from defendant.
(Trial Court Findings of Fact % 40,41,42)
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"[A] contract may be [abandoned] by acts or conduct of the parties inconsistent with the
continued existence of the contract." Harris v. IES Assoc. Inc.. 2003 UT App 112, fl37, 69 P.3d
297 (internal quotations omitted.) In this case, both parties undertook acts inconsistent with the
continued existence of the Contracts.
HDF acted inconsistently with the existence of the Contracts when it cancelled the
Contracts and refunded the deposit/cash down given by Watkins as security for the performance
of the Contracts. Watkins acted inconsistently with the Contracts when he accepted the return of
his deposit and negotiated the check without objection or inquiry.
An intent to abandon "may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the parties" or "from
the attendant circumstances". Parduhn v. Bennett. 2002 UT 93 f l 1, 61. P.2d 982.
Both parties demonstrated by their conduct and actions an unequivocal expression and
intent to abandon the Contracts. Watkins' action of negotiating the check sent to him by HDF
without reservation, question, or inquiry demonstrated unequivocally that he considered the
Contracts cancelled and void. Watkins' actions were clearly inconsistent with the continued
existence of the Contracts. See generally, Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750,753
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating that abandonment is the intentional relinquishment of one's right in
the contract).
Watkins' silence by not contacting HDF upon receipt of the $2,000.00 check or at any other
time prior to June 2005 also demonstrated Watkins' abandonment of the Contracts. Additionally,
Watkins acted inconsistent with continuation of the Contracts when he, after receipt of the
$2,000.00 check from HDF, began contacting other Ford dealers in an attempt to purchase a Ford
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GT40 from other dealers. (Watkins Testimony, TT 53:4-23.)
The Trial Court correctly ruled that Watkins acquiesced to HDF's abandonment when he
accepted the return of his deposit and negotiated the deposit check. Both parties had demonstrated
by their conduct an unequivocal intent to abandon the Contracts. The conclusion by the Trial Court
that the parties abandoned the Contract is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
The circumstances of this case demonstrate that Watkins abandoned and relinquished his
right to the Contracts. Thus, the Appellate Court should not have reversed unless it was persuaded
that the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of the Trial Court. However, the
evidence, and the Trial Court's factual findings demonstrate that the parties mutually abandoned
the Contracts.
POINT HI:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT HDF
BREACHED THE CONTRACTS.

As discussed in detail above, the Contracts specifically provided that Watkins contracted
to purchase two (2) Ford GT40's. The Contracts represented what Watkins requested. Even if the
name of the vehicle changed, Watkins did not request a modification of the Contracts to reflect a
different model, though Watkins knew he had the right to make, and that he had in the past made,
such a request.
The trial court concluded:
The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts based upon the plain
meaning contained in the Contracts.
The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to plaintiff a "Ford GT 40".
Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as such, defendant did not
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breach the parties' Contracts and, as such, plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed.
(Trial Court Conclusions of Law ffl[3,4, 5.)
In this case, the Contracts are undisputedly clear. Watkins asked to purchase two (2)
GT40's and, pursuant to Watkins' request, two (2) Contracts were prepared, read, and signed by
Watkins. The Contracts represented the parties' bargain in every respect.
The Contracts at issue in this case fail to specify a time within which HDF would deliver the
automobiles to Watkins. Accordingly, the trial court found:
It was not until February 2004, over two years after plaintiff accepted the return of
his deposit, that defendant learned that it would be allocated a Ford GT based upon
defendant being awarded the Share of the Nation Award for the 2003 sales year.
Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored by defendant over two years after
plaintiff accepted a return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court find that
defendant returned plaintiffs check in good faith and based upon its reasonable
belief they would not be allotted any Ford GT 40's.
(Finding of Fact 1PP9, 41.)
If a contract fails to specify a time of performance the law implies that it shall be done within
a reasonable time under the circumstances, and in case of controversy that is something for the
trial court to determine. Watson v. Hatch. 728 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1986).

Under the

circumstances of this case the return of the deposits, which was not objected to by Watkins, was
made in reasonable time and at that time the Contracts terminated. Since the Contracts are absent
any indication that Watkins and HDF intended to hold the option open indefinitely, HDF submits
that the Contracts contemplate that HDF was free to abandon the Contracts when it understood
it would not be receiving any GT40s within a reasonable time.
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POINT IV:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S
DETERMINATION THAT WATKINS FAILED TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES.

Damages awarded for breach of contract should place the non breaching party in as good
a position as if the contract had been performed. However, the non breaching party has an active
duty to mitigate his damages, and he may not, either by action or inaction, aggravate the injury
occasioned by the breach. Mahmood v. Ross. 1999 UT104, P31,990P.2d933. In order to satisfy
the duty to mitigate damages, a non breaching party must make "reasonable efforts and
expenditures." Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co.. 743 P.2d 1212,1214 (Utah 1987).
In this case, Watkins was offered a Ford GT for MSRP. Watkins declined to purchase the
vehicle (Watkins Testimony, TT 107:15-19) and thereby failed to mitigate his damages. Watkins
argues in his brief that the Trial Court's Finding of Fact 39, which provides: "Plaintiff refused
defendant's offer to purchase a Ford GT. Plaintiff's refusal to purchase the Ford GT constitutes
a failure of plaintiff to mitigate his damages", amounts to a "conclusion of law" and should be
accorded no deference by a court of appeal. (WB, pg. 47.)
The finding by the Trial Court is supported by the undisputed facts. Watkins testified that
he intended to purchase the Ford GT40 in his name (Watkins Testimony, TT 90:16-18) and then
sell the vehicle for a profit (Watkins Testimony, TT 90:19-25; 91:1-4). Watkins, however provided
no evidence as to what he could actually sell a used GT40 for. Watkins only testified that he had
a "list of people" who he could sell the car to (Watkins Testimony, TT 8-10). The "list" was known
only to Watkins. (Watkins Testimony, TT 11-14.) At no time did Watkins present any evidence of
any monetary or other damage he sustained as a result of not being able to purchase and resell
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a Ford GT40. Therefore, the Appellate Court erred when it overturned the trial court's factual
findings as to Watkins' failure to mitigate.
POINT V:

HDF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.

In Utah, attorney's fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract. Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). The Contracts provided:
In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce any of the terms, conditions
or warranties in this agreement, Purchaser agrees to pay reasonable attorney's
fees, court costs, and collection fees.
Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-826 provides:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed
after April 28,1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract,
or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
Clearly, the award of attorney's fees and costs by the trial court is supported by the
Contracts and HDF should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon testimony and evidence presented at trial, the Trial Court concluded:
The Contracts are clear and unambiguous and were intended to be the final and
complete expression of the parties' bargains.
The Contracts between the parties are integrated agreements.
The Court finds the parties abandoned the Contracts.
Defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as such, plaintiffs Complaint
must be dismissed.
Defendant is awarded its reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be
proven by Affidavit.
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(Conclusions of Law flfl, 2, 9,11,12)
The Trial Court's decisions were each supported by the evidence and the law. Based upon
the foregoing, HDF requests this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of Watkins' Complaint and
award of attorney's fees and costs to HDF. HDF further requests that HDF be awarded its
attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal.
Finally, the flaw in the Appellate Court's decision can be addressed by the question could
HDF have forced Watkins, three (3) years after the Contracts were written and over two(2) years
after Watkins accepted the return of his deposit, to purchase a Ford GT when the contracts
provided that Watkins had contracted to purchase a Ford GT40?
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not strictly limiting its review to the trial
Court's proper interpretation of the Contracts.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of August, 2011.
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